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ABSTRACT
CHANGE DETECTION IN RHESUS MONKEYS AND HUMANS
Deepna Devkar, M.S.
Supervisory Professor: Anthony Wright, Ph.D.

Visual working memory (VWM) is the temporary retention of visual
information and a key component of cognitive processing. The classical
paradigm for studying VWM and its encoding limitations has been change
detection. Early work focused on how many items could be stored in VWM,
leading to the popular theory that humans could remember no more than 4±1
items. More recently, proposals have suggested that VWM is a noisy, continuous
resource distributed across virtually all items in the visual field, resulting in
diminished memory quality rather than limited quantity. This debate about the
nature of VWM has predominantly been studied with humans. Nevertheless,
nonhuman species could add a great deal to the debate by providing evidence
related to evolutionary continuity (similarities and/or differences) and model
systems for investigating the neural basis of VWM. To this end, in the first aim,
we tested monkeys and humans in virtually identical change detection tasks,
where the subjects identified which memory item had changed between two
displays. In addition to the typical manipulation of the number of items to-beremembered (2-5 oriented bars), we varied the change magnitude (degree of
orientation change) – a critical manipulation for discriminating among leading
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models of VWM encoding limitations. We found that in both species VWM
performance was best accounted for by a model in which memory items are
encoded in a noisy manner, where quality of memory is variable and on average
decreases with increasing set size.
The second aim focused on the decision-making component of change
detection, where observers use noisy sensory information to make a judgment
about where the change occurred. We tested monkeys and humans in the same
change detection task (Aim 1), but with ellipses that varied in their height-to-width
ratio so that their reliability of communicating orientation discrimination could be
manipulated. The high-reliability ellipses were long and narrow, and the lowreliability ellipses were short and wide. We compared models that differed with
respect to how the observers incorporate knowledge of stimulus reliability during
decision-making. We found that in both species performance was best accounted
for by a Bayesian model in which observers take into account the uncertainty of
sensory observations when making perceptual judgments, giving more weight to
more reliable evidence.
The comparative results across these related primate species are
suggestive of evolutionary continuity of basic VWM processing in primates
generally. These findings provide a strong theoretical foundation for how VWM
processes work and establish rhesus monkeys as a good animal model system
for physiological investigations to elucidate the neural substrates of VWM
processing.
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1

In a brief instant, our visual system can be inundated with an
overwhelming amount of information. The ability to store and process critical
information efficiently from our rich, dynamic, and highly complex visual world is
important to the survival of a species. Visual working memory (VWM) is the
short-term retention and manipulation of visual information over a few seconds
(Baddeley, 1992). It is a temporary buffer that allows the brain to compare
information from the immediate past to the present and integrate changes in a
visual scene (Phillips, 1974; Rensink, 2002).
A simple example of the importance of VWM in our everyday lives is when
a car driver needs to make a quick decision about changing lanes: he/she must
be able to detect changes in a traffic situation after looking in all directions (rear
view mirror, side mirrors, front view of the road, etc.) and remember that
information sufficiently so that it can be integrated to make safe and optimal
decisions. Similarly, non-human animals constantly use VWM to detect changes
in their visual scene to effectively navigate, forage, interact with conspecifics, and
avoid predators.
Apart from its role in detecting changes in the visual scene, VWM also
underpins the execution of many basic cognitive processes such as smooth
visual perception across saccadic eye movements, target search, guidance of
goal-directed reaching movements, and filtering of relevant information (Brouwer
& Knill, 2007; Chun & Potter, 1995; Henderson, 2008; Irwin, 1991; Miller,
Erickson, & Desimone, 1996; Rainer, Asaad, & Miller, 1998). Additionally, VWM
is interlinked with visual attention, frontal executive control centers, and long-term
2

visual memory (Awh, Vogel, & Oh, 2006; Chun, 2011; Cowan, 2011; Fukuda &
Vogel, 2011). Because vision is the dominant sense of many animals, including
primates, VWM is thus fundamental to the cognition of such species.
In humans, performance on VWM tasks has been correlated with
measures of higher cognitive abilities such as problem solving, learning,
language comprehension, selective/executive attention, and general intelligence
(Conway, Kane, & Engle, 2003; Cowan, 2001; Cowan et al., 2005; Kiyonaga &
Egner, 2014). Given its importance in everyday cognitive functioning, it is not
surprising that deficits in VWM have been associated with several cognitive and
neuropsychiatric disorders such as spatial neglect, parietal and temporal lobe
damage, Schizophrenia, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Autism,
Alzheimer’s disease, Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, and Depression (AlescioLautier et al., 2007; Berryhill & Olson, 2008; Christopher & MacDonald, 2005;
Ezzyat & Olson, 2008; Farmer et al., 2000; Gold, Wilk, McMahon, Buchanan, &
Luck, 2003; Kim, Liu, Glizer, Tannock, & Woltering, 2014; Pellicano, Gibson,
Maybery, Durkin, & Badcock, 2005; Pisella, Berberovic, & Mattingley, 2004;
Vasterling, Brailey, Constans, & Sutker, 1998). Despite decades of work relating
VWM to psychiatric diseases and cognition generally, answers to many basic
processes of VWM remain elusive. With so much left to be understood about the
impairments associated with failures of VWM, a better understanding of the
normal functioning of VWM mechanisms might provide a better foundation for
treating these impairments and evaluating the efficacy of treatment.

3

Behavioral research aimed at understanding VWM has used delayed
matching-to-sample, memory span, or N-back tasks which in many cases require
remembering only a single memorandum at a given instant (Fuster & Alexander,
1971; Goldman-Rakic, 1995; Miller et al., 1996). Although these approaches
have been influential in understanding some time limitations of VWM by testing
only single-item VWM, they are not particularly relevant to natural visual scenes,
where multiple items must be processed and integrated in a continuously
changing stream of information (Funahashi, Bruce, & Goldman-Rakic, 1989;
Fuster & Alexander, 1971; Goldman-Rakic, 1990; E. K. Miller et al., 1996). The
basic processes by which multiple items are encoded and processed in visual
working memory needs to be better understood for assessing many of the
underlying processes, neural circuitry, and failures of VWM.
Over the past few decades, the leading task for investigating multiple-item
VWM and the amount of information that can be maintained simultaneously in
VWM has been change detection (Rensink, 2002). In a typical change detection
task, an observer is presented with a sample array of two or more stimuli, which
is followed by a brief delay (usually more than 80 ms to exceed the duration of
attentional capture). The number of stimuli in the sample array (or the items that
are to-be-remembered) will be referred to as set size. After the delay, a test array
is presented with a changed item and the observer’s task is to identify whether or
where the change occurred between the two arrays.
Results from such human change detection studies have shown
proportion correct to be very high for small set sizes (e.g., 2 - 4 items), but
4

becomes progressively less accurate with increasing set sizes beyond 3 to 4
items (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Pashler, 1988; Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2001).
These results have led to the popular theory that VWM is capacity limited, where
only a fixed number of items can be held in memory. This fixed-capacity theory
was first suggested by George Miller; however at the time, the ‘magical’ number
was thought to be 7± 2 items (Miller, 1956). The capacity was then estimated to
be higher than it is now because of the human ability to “chunk” bits of
information together to maximize capacity. This number has since been replaced
with 4 ± 1 items (Cowan, 2001). This fixed-capacity theory has also been called
the item-limit or slot theory because only a limited number of items are proposed
to be stored in discrete “slots”. According to this theory, items are encoded in
memory in an all-or-none fashion such that remembered items are stored with
high fidelity, and no information is retained about other items. This theory of a
fixed capacity has dominated much of the thinking about working memory for
about half-a-century and has formed the basis of many neural investigations of
human VWM (Edward Awh, Barton, & Vogel, 2007; Luck & Vogel, 2013; Rouder
et al., 2008; Todd & Marois, 2004; Vogel & Machizawa, 2004; Xu & Chun, 2006).
In the last decade, the item-limit model has been challenged in the human
literature on several grounds. First of all, even though it has been argued that the
capacity estimate is stable across several short-term memory modalities
(including visual, verbal, and auditory) and across testing paradigms (Cowan,
2001, 2005), some studies have reported that this so-called ‘magical number’
actually does vary when information load and stimulus complexity are
5

manipulated (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Eng, Chen, & Jiang, 2005; Olson &
Jiang, 2002). Second, the fixed-capacity theory proposes an absolute view of allor-none storage that is highly questionable based on grounds of signal detection
theory. Signal detection theory has dominated psychophysics for the past half
century, showing that sensory observations are subject to noise, and detection
performance is imperfect due to errors in separating the true signal from noise
(Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). Third, the notion that a
stimulus can be encoded perfectly is at odds with the evidence that neural
systems are inherently noisy (e.g., Faisal, Selen, & Wolpert, 2008).
An alternative theory that reconciles most of the problems associated with
all-or-none fixed capacity is that memory is a continuous resource that can be
allocated to many (if not all items) in the field of view (Ma, Husain, & Bays, 2014).
At the inception of these resource models, Wilken & Ma (2004) proposed that
stimuli are encoded in memory in a noisy fashion, with the level of noise per item
increasing with set size. Memory precision (which is inversely related to noise)
decreases with the number of objects in the visual scene. Thus, according to the
resource view, performance decreases because of a reduction in the quality of
memories, rather than a cap or limit on the number of items that can be stored
(Bays & Husain, 2008; Bays, Catalao, & Husain, 2009; Keshvari, van den Berg,
& Ma, 2013; van den Berg, Shin, Chou, George, & Ma, 2012; Wilken & Ma,
2004). Nevertheless, in an attempt to salvage the item-limit theory, variants on
the item-limit theory have been proposed, including combining fixed capacity with
resource (e.g., Zhang & Luck, 2008). Recent work in humans has attempted to
6

distinguish among the item-limit model, its more recent variants, and resource
models (Keshvari et al., 2013; van den Berg, Awh, & Ma, 2014; van den Berg,
Shin, et al., 2012; van den Berg & Ma, 2014).
Compared to this rich body of ongoing work in humans, very little is known
about how visual information is encoded in non-human animals and whether their
VWM system suffers from the same limitations as humans. Rhesus monkeys are
an ideal species for such investigations because they have similar visual memory
processing mechanisms as humans (Wright, 2007; Goldman-Rakic, 1990;
Goldman-Rakic, 1995; Sands & Wright, 1980). Results from such studies might
help to disambiguate some of the controversies surrounding visual memory
processing mechanisms in primates generally. For example, if rhesus monkeys
(or some other animal species) were to show qualitative similarity to humans in
underlying mechanisms of VWM then this nonhuman animal could be used as a
model system for invasive investigations of VWM such as electrophysiological
recordings, lesions, genetic, and pharmacological manipulations.
Several recent studies have begun to investigate these questions in,
rhesus monkeys, but the results and findings have been mixed (Buschman,
Siegel, Roy, & Miller, 2011; Elmore et al., 2011; Heyselaar, Johnston, & Paré,
2011; Lara & Wallis, 2012).. For example, Elmore et al. (2011) noted that
memory sensitivity (discriminability, d’, used as a measure of precision)
decreases as the number of memory items increases. Moreover, this decline in
performance is well fit by a power law function. Similarly, Lara and Wallis (2012)
reported that precision of memory representations, and subsequently,
7

performance accuracy decreases with increasing set size. These findings are
consistent with the theory of a continuous-resource model, where memory
resource can be flexibly allocated to multiple items. Buschman and colleagues
simultaneously recorded from area V4 and prefrontal cortex in the rhesus
macaque while the animal was performing a change localization task at varying
set sizes. They found that at the neural level, information is distributed among
multiple items in the visual scene in a graded fashion. However, this sharing of
resource only occurred when items were displayed in the same visual hemifield.
They concluded that the two hemifields seemed to have discrete, slot-like
resources with independent capacities. To interpret neural data from such an
experiment, it is essential to connect them to critical measures describing the
animal’s behavioral performance. However, which behavioral parameters are
most relevant depends on which model describes behavior best. For example, if
a resource model were to fit the behavioral results better than a fixed-capacity
model, then the common practice of finding neural correlates of the item capacity
would make little sense, and instead would point to a resource description of
neural activity. Thus, it is essential to first determine which model best accounts
for non-human primate behavior in order to specify the framework for neural
investigations of the basis of VWM.
Unfortunately, psychophysical studies with monkeys are sparse and none
have performed detailed model comparisons such as those in the human
literature (Keshvari, van den Berg, & Ma, 2012; Keshvari et al., 2013; van den
Berg, Shin, et al., 2012; but see Lara & Wallis, 2012 for limited model
8

comparisons). Ma and colleagues have suggested that in order to distinguish
among models of VWM, it is important to measure change detection performance
across a wide range of change magnitudes, in addition to the typical
manipulation of set size. This approach has been used effectively with humans to
distinguish among leading models of VWM in detailed model comparisons
(Keshvari et al., 2012, 2013; van den Berg, Shin, et al., 2012). However, change
detection studies with monkeys have typically used displays containing highly
discriminable stimuli such as clip art images of everyday objects or colored
shapes (Buschman et al., 2011; Elmore et al., 2011; Heyselaar et al., 2011; Lara
& Wallis, 2012). Differences among such highly discriminable stimuli are difficult
to measure (but see Elmore et al, 2011 for multidimensional scaling of stimuli).
Nevertheless, measuring discriminability of such stimuli would not in itself provide
a basis for distinguishing among current models of VWM. To make such
distinctions, the degree of change discrimination needs to be parametrically
varied to produce psychometric functions, where accuracy gradually rises from
near chance performance (50% correct in many cases) to near maximum
accuracy for very large change discriminations. To this end, in the first set of
experiments to be presented, we used oriented line bars and systematically
varied change magnitude along with set size. By using these manipulations and
the psychometric functions generated by them, our purpose was to rigorously
compare five leading models of VWM encoding in parallel with monkeys and
humans in an identical change detection paradigm. The theory and
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computational details of each of these models are described in detail in Chapter
2.
VWM processing consists of two components: an encoding stage, where
internal representations of the observed stimulus are generated, and a decisionmaking stage, during which information from these noisy measurements is used
to make a decision. Change detection tasks are designed to test both the
encoding and decision components of VWM. The observer encodes information
about the sample stimuli, compares the maintained memory of the sample stimuli
with the test stimuli at the corresponding locations, makes a judgment about
which test stimulus has changed, and then makes a response based on this
decision. Memory of the stimuli are seldom perfectly precise, therefore this lessthan-perfect precision translates (proportionately) to noisy internal
representations of stimuli. This internal noise varies across stimuli and trials. For
example, even when the same stimulus is presented repeatedly, the sensory
responses that it evokes in the form of neural activity can vary largely from trialto-trial (Faisal et al., 2008; Tolhurst, Movshon, & Dean, 1983). Thus, an observer
has to make a judgment about sensory observations in the presence of
uncertainty caused by both internal and external factors. In making such
judgments, knowing the nature of memory precision would benefit the observer in
making better decisions.
Signal detection theory suggests that observers use Bayesian inference to
make decisions that will maximize his/her decision performance on a trial, given
the noisy stimulus encoding. In the change detection task, for example, a
10

Bayesian observer uses this noisy information to compute a probability
distribution of whether or where the change occurred. Based on this computation,
the observer chooses the location with the highest probability of change. In
recent decades, studies have shown that in many perceptual tasks, humans are
Bayesian observers and take into account the uncertainty associated with the
noisy encoding of stimuli (Knill & Pouget, 2004; Knill & Richards, 1996). This
uncertainty about the stimulus and precision itself can vary from trial-to-trial.
Thus, in order to optimize performance, the observer must interpret uncertain
sensory information by taking into account memory precision on a trial-by-trial
basis. This process is referred to as “probabilistic computation’’ (Ma, 2012).
Psychophysical evidence for these types of probabilistic computations
have been reported across several paradigms, including change detection, cue
combination, multisensory integration, object perception, and sensorimotor
learning (Angelaki, Gu, & DeAngelis, 2009; Ernst & Banks, 2002; Kersten,
Mamassian, & Yuille, 2004; Keshvari et al., 2012; Knill & Richards, 1996; Körding
& Wolpert, 2004). In these paradigms, the encoding precision not only varies
from trial to trial for the same stimulus but also varies across different stimuli and
possibly other factors as well (e.g., location). The purpose of explicitly
manipulating the nature of the stimuli themselves (in addition to their orientation)
is to vary the reliability of the stimulus, such as the height-to-width aspect ratio of
an ellipse or the contrast ratio of the stimuli. For example, shorter, wider ellipses
would provide less reliable information about orientation and consequently less
information about orientation changes than longer, narrower ellipses. A
11

Bayesian observer would give more weight to measurements with higher
reliability and thus higher certainty. It is important to note that Bayesian inference
does not always translate to optimal inference (Ma, 2012). Bayesian inference is
based on a subjective computation over sensory observations, which are prone
to incorrect assumptions. When an observer’s Bayesian estimation is based on
incorrect assumptions, he/she can be suboptimal. The question, then, is the
degree to which observers optimally evaluate the reliability of the stimulus in
making a task-relevant decision.
Aim 2 of my thesis focuses on the decision-making component of VWM in
a task related to that of Aim 1. I tested monkeys and humans in the same
decision task and compared three Bayesian models of decision-making that vary
with respect to the assumption that the observer makes about memory precision,
based on their evaluation of stimulus uncertainty. The theoretical explanations of
these models and their mathematical derivations are described in Chapter 4.
Qualitative similarities in monkeys and humans for encoding (Aim 1) and
decision-making (Aim 2) would suggest evolutionary continuity and provide a
model system for exploring the neurobiology and neural circuitry of VWM.
Differences could also be important. For example, monkeys might be similar to
humans in stimulus processing (encoding) but different from humans in decision
optimality. Such results might suggest a judgment difference despite processing
similarity, and perhaps lead to a better understanding of how these fundamental
cognitive processes are employed and how they might be improved.

12

CHAPTER 2: MODEL FORMALISM

13

As discussed in the previous chapter, VWM processing consists of two
stages: an encoding stage, where internal representations of visually presented
stimuli are generated in memory, and a decision stage, where the internal
representations are used to make a decision. We conducted two experiments of
change detection that were designed to tap into both of these stages of
processing. In Aim 1, we tested leading models of VWM encoding. In this task,
observers briefly viewed a sample array of N randomly oriented bars (henceforth
called items) and, following a delay, a test array containing two randomly chosen
items from the sample array, of which one had a different orientation than in the
sample array. The magnitude of the associated orientation change could take
one of nine values. Observers reported which item had changed orientation. In
this chapter I describe how we mathematically formalized and tested the
encoding and decision stages.
Encoding
We tested five leading models of encoding, which differ in the way that
they conceptualize the precise nature of memory resource and how it is allocated
across multiple items in the visual scene. The five models are: item-limit, equal
precision, equal precision with a fixed capacity, variable precision, and variable
precision with a fixed capacity. The theory and modeling of each of these models
are described below. N here represents set size, or the number of items in the
sample array and K represents capacity.
Item-limit (infinite-precision) model

14

In the item-limit model, observers cannot store more than K items. When
N≤K, all items are stored. The probability of being correct is then 1−ε, where ε
accounts for lapses of attention and unintended responses. When N>K, K
randomly selected items from the sample display are stored. When the test
display appears, there are then four scenarios to consider:

•

Both test items were stored. This happens with probability

K ( K − 1)
N ( N − 1)

. The

probability of being correct is then 1−ε.
•

One test item was stored, the other was not. This happens with probability

2

•

K (N − K )
N ( N − 1)

. The probability of being correct is then 1−ε.

Neither test item was stored. This happens with probability

( N − K )( N − K − 1)
N ( N − 1)
The observer then has to guess about which item
changed, and probability correct is 0.5.
Overall proportion correct is then

PC ( N, K ) =

K ( K − 1)
N (N − 1)

= 1− ε −

(1 − ε ) + 2

K (N − K )
N (N − 1)

(1− ε ) +

(N − K )(N − K − 1) 0.5 − ε
(
)
N (N − 1)

15

(N − K )(N − K − 1) ⋅ 0.5
N (N − 1)

Note that storing all N items (K=N) yields the same proportion correct,
namely 1−ε, as storing only N−1 items, since even if one test item was not stored,
the trial can be answered correctly by using the other test item. As can be seen
from the equation, in the item-limit model, proportion correct depends on set size
but not on change magnitude.
Noise-based (finite-precision) models
We assume that both orientations in the test display, which we denote by
φ1 and φ2, are known noiselessly to the observer, because they remain on the
screen until the subject responds. We model the memories of the orientations in
the sample display as noisy. Noise can stem from encoding (presentation time
was limited) or maintenance of memories; we do not distinguish between these
possibilities. We model the noisy memory of the ith item in the sample display,
denoted xi (i=1,..,N), as following a Von Mises distribution (circular Gaussian
distribution because our stimuli exist in circular space) centered at the true
stimulus, θi, with concentration parameter κi:

p ( xi | θ i ) =

1
2π I0 (κ i )

κi cos( xi −θi )

e

.

(1)

where I0 is the modified Bessel functions of the first kind of order 0. We have
postulated previously that the role of precision is played by the Fisher information
in this memory representation, denoted Ji (Keshvari et al., 2013; van den Berg,
Shin, et al., 2012). This quantity is related to the concentration parameter through
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Ji = κ i

I1 (κ i )
I0 (κ i )

,

where I1 is the modified Bessel functions of the first kind of order 1. The
relationship between precision and concentration parameter is nearly the identity
and none of our results would qualitatively change if one were to replace Ji by κi.
In the equal-precision (EP) model, the precision of each item is inversely related
to set size through a power law:

Ji =

J N =1
.
Nα

where JN=1 is the precision of a single item. The precision of all items in a display
is equal.
In the equal precision with fixed capacity (EPF) model (also known as slots-plusresources), no more than K items can be stored. Thus, the number of stored
items is min(N,K). The precision of a stored item is inversely related to the
number of stored items through a power law,

Ji =

JN =1
α .
min( N ,K )

The precision associated with a non-stored item is zero. When N≤K, the EPF
model is equal to the EP model.
In the variable-precision (VP) model, precision exhibits fluctuations across both
space and time. The precision of each item is drawn independently from a
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gamma distribution with mean J and scale parameter τ. This mean is inversely
related to set size through a power law:

J =

JN =1
,
Nα

where J N =1 is the mean precision of a single item.
The variable precision with fixed capacity (VPF) model is equal to the VP model
when N≤K. The precision of a stored item is drawn independently from a gamma
distribution with mean J and scale parameter τ. This mean is inversely related to
the number of stored items through a power law:

J =

JN =1
α

min ( N, K )

where J N =1 is the mean precision of a single item. The precision associated with
a non-stored item is zero.
The models have 2, 2, 3, 3, and 4 free parameters, respectively.
Decision-making
So far, we have described the encoding stage: how stimuli give rise to
noisy memories. What is also needed in each of the noise-based models is a
description of how the observer makes the two-alternative localization decision
based on the noisy memories and the test display. We use an ideal (Bayesianoptimal) observer to describe this process. Bayesian-optimal inference refers to
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the decision strategy that maximizes the observer’s accuracy on a given trial
based on the noisy measurements (Knill & Richards, 1996). The resulting
decision rule is similar to the ideal-observer models of related N-alternative
change localization and change detection tasks (Keshvari et al., 2012, 2013; van
den Berg, Shin, et al., 2012), but differs in the details.
Step 1: Generative model
We begin by describing the decision process for the EP and VP models.
The diagram shows the relevant variables: the location of the change, L (1 or 2),
the magnitude of the change, Δ, the relevant sample orientations, θ1 and θ2 (all
other sample items are irrelevant to the decision), their noisy memories, x1, and
x2, and the two test orientations, φ1 and φ2.

L

θ1, θ2

Δ

φ1, φ2

x1, x2
Each variable has an associated probability distribution. Since both test locations
are equally likely to contain the change, we have p(L)=0.5. Change magnitude Δ
and each of the sample orientations have discrete distributions, but we
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2

⎛ 1 ⎞
1
approximate them by uniform distributions, p ( Δ ) =
, and p (θ1,θ 2 ) = ⎜
⎟ .
2π
⎝ 2π ⎠
The noisy memories x1 and x2 are distributed according to

p ( x1, x2 | θ1,θ2 ) = p ( x1 | θ1 ) p ( x2 | θ2 ) , where p(xi|θi) is given by Eq. (1). Finally, the
test orientations are (ϕ1,ϕ2 ) = (θ1,θ2 ) + Δ1L , where 1L is equal to (1,0) when L=1
and (0,1) when L=2.
Step 2: Inference
The observer infers L based on the noisy memories x1 and x2 and the test
orientations φ1 and φ2. An ideal observer does this by computing the posterior
distribution over L, p(L|x1,x2,φ1,φ2). Since L is binary, all information about the
posterior is contained in the log posterior ratio, which can be rewritten using
Bayes’ rule:

log

p (L = 1| x1, x2 ,ϕ1,ϕ2 )
p (L = 2 | x1, x2 ,ϕ1,ϕ2 )

= log
= log

p (L = 1)
p (L = 2 )

+ log

p ( x1, x2 ,ϕ1,ϕ2 | L = 1)
p ( x1, x2 ,ϕ1,ϕ2 | L = 2 )

p ( x1, x2 ,ϕ1,ϕ2 | L = 1)
p ( x1, x2 ,ϕ1,ϕ2 | L = 2 )

since p(L=1)=p(L=2). We evaluate the likelihood of L=1:
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,

p ( x1, x2 ,ϕ1,ϕ2 | L = 1) = ∫ ∫∫ p ( x1 | θ1 ) p ( x2 | θ 2 ) p (ϕ1,ϕ2 | θ1,θ2 , Δ, L = 1) p ( Δ ) dθ1dθ2d Δ
= ∫ ∫∫ p ( x1 | θ1 ) p ( x2 | θ2 ) δ (ϕ1 − θ1 − Δ ) δ (ϕ2 − θ 2 )

1
dθ1dθ 2d Δ
2π

1
p ( x1 | θ1 = ϕ1 − Δ ) p ( x2 | θ2 = ϕ2 ) d Δ
2π ∫
1
1
1
κ cos x −ϕ
κ cos x −ϕ +Δ
=
e 2 ( 2 2) ∫
e 2 ( 1 1 )d Δ
2π 2π I0 (κ 2 )
2π I0 (κ 2 )
=

=

1
1
κ cos x −ϕ
e 2 ( 2 2)
2π 2π I0 (κ 2 )

Similarly, the likelihood of L=2 is:

p ( x1, x2 ,ϕ1,ϕ2 | L = 2) =

1
1
κ cos x −ϕ
e 1 ( 1 1) .
2π 2π I0 (κ1 )

Combining, we find for the log posterior ratio

log

p ( L = 1| x1, x2 ,ϕ1,ϕ2 )
p ( L = 2 | x1, x2 ,ϕ1,ϕ2 )

1
1
κ cos x −ϕ
e 2 ( 2 2)
2π 2π I0 (κ 2 )
= log
1
1
κ cos x −ϕ
e 1 ( 1 1)
2π 2π I0 (κ1 )
= log

I 0 (κ 1 )
I 0 (κ 2 )

+ κ 2 cos ( x2 − ϕ2 ) − κ1 cos ( x1 − ϕ1 )

The ideal observer responds that the change occurred at location 1 when
the log posterior ratio is positive:

log

I0 (κ1 )
I0 (κ 2 )

+ κ 2 cos ( x2 − ϕ2 ) − κ1 cos ( x1 − ϕ1 ) > 0 (2)

This decision rule is valid for both the VP and EP models. In the VP
model, precision per item is a random variable, and therefore κ1 and κ2 will
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generally not be equal to each other. However, in the case of the EP model, we
have κ1=κ2 and the inequality simplifies to

cos ( x2 − ϕ2 ) > cos ( x1 − ϕ1 ) .

(3)

This rule is intuitive: the observer reports that the change occurred at
location 1 when the angular distance between the noisy memory at location 2
and the test orientation at location 2 is smaller than the corresponding distance at
location 1. Then, there is more evidence that the change occurred at location 1.
One can think of Eq. (2) as a precision-weighted version of Eq. (3).
The EPF model is very similar to the EP model, but with one difference
when N>K. Then, a noisy measurement has a probability of not being stored.
This is equivalent to setting the concentration parameter of the corresponding
memory to 0. Thus, we can immediately obtain the decision rule from the EPF
model by taking special cases of Eq. (2):

⎧Report location 1 when....
⎪
⎪cos ( x2 − ϕ2 ) > cos ( x1 − ϕ1 ) if both items were stored;
⎪
⎨κ1 cos ( x1 − ϕ1 ) < log I0 (κ1 ) if only item 1 was stored;
⎪
⎪κ 2 cos ( x2 − ϕ2 ) > log I0 (κ 2 ) if only item 2 was stored;
⎪ ... and guess randomly when neither item was stored.
⎩

(4)

The VPF model is identical to the VP model when N≤K. When N>K, just
as in the EPF model above, a noisy measurement has a probability of not being
stored (precision = 0). But, unlike the EPF model, the concentration parameters,

κ 1 and κ 2 in the VPF model are drawn independently. With these modifications,
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we can again take the special cases of Eq. (2) and obtain the decision rules for
the VPF model:

⎧Report location 1 when....
⎪
⎪log I0 (κ1 ) + κ cos ( x − ϕ ) > κ cos ( x − ϕ ) if both items were stored;
2
2
2
1
1
1
⎪ I0 (κ 2 )
⎪⎪
(5)
⎨κ1 cos ( x1 − ϕ1 ) < log I0 (κ1 ) if only item 1 was stored;
⎪
⎪κ 2 cos ( x2 − ϕ2 ) > log I0 (κ 2 ) if only item 2 was stored;
⎪ ... and guess randomly when neither item was stored.
⎪
⎪⎩
The second and third inequality in the EPF and VPF models may seem
counterintuitive, since they only involve one memory. However, they make
sense: even when the observer only has the memory corresponding to one of the
test items, the discrepancy between the memory and the test is still informative
about whether or not the change occurred in that one item.
Expected behavior
If we had access to the observer’s noisy memories x1 and x2 on each trial,
the model would predict their response exactly. Since we don’t, the best we can
do is to compute the probability of being correct for a given stimulus condition.
Under the assumptions in our generative model, the stimulus condition is
determined completely by set size N and change magnitude Δ, and the values of
θ1 and θ2 are irrelevant. Thus, we are interested in the probability that the
decision rule (Eq. (2) for VP, Eq. (3) for EP, Eq. (4) for EPF, and Eq. (5) for VPF)
returns the correct location, when the memories x1 and x2 follow their respective
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distributions given N and Δ. Without loss of generality, we compute proportion
correct by taking θ1=θ2=0, and L=1, so that φ1=0 and φ2=Δ.
For the EP model then,

Proportion correct (N, Δ ) = Pr (cos x2 > cos ( x1 − Δ ); x1, x2 ~ VM(0,κ ))
where VM(µ,κ) denotes the Von Mises distribution with mean µ and
concentration parameter κ.
For the EPF model, proportion correct is computed as a sum across the four
possibilities for which items were stored (see Eq. (4)):

Proportion correct ( N, Δ ) =
+
+
+

K ( K − 1)
N ( N − 1)

⋅ Pr ( cos x2 > cos ( x1 − Δ ); x1, x2 ~ VM (0,κ )

K (N − K )
N ( N − 1)
K (N − K )
N ( N − 1)

)

⋅ Pr (κ cos ( x1 − Δ ) < log I0 (κ ); x1 ~ VM ( 0,κ ) )
⋅ Pr (κ cos x2 > log I0 (κ ); x2 ~ VM (0,κ ) )

(N − K )(N − K − 1) ⋅ 0.5
N ( N − 1)

For the VP model,

⎛
I0 (κ1 )
+ κ 2 cos x2 − κ1 cos ( x1 − Δ ) > 0;
⎜ log
I0 (κ 2 )
Proportion correct ( N, Δ ) = Pr ⎜
⎜⎜
⎝ x1 ~VM (0,κ1 ), x2 ~VM (0,κ 2 ); Ji ~ Gamma J ,τ

( )

⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟⎟
⎠

For the VPF model, proportion correct is computed as a sum across the four
possibilities for which items were stored (see Eq. (5)):
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⎛
⎞
I 0 (κ 1 )
+ κ 2 cos ( x2 − ϕ2 ) > κ1 cos ( x1 − ϕ1 ); ⎟
⎜ log
I 0 (κ 2 )
⎜
⎟
K ( K − 1)
⎜
⎟
Proportion correct ( N, Δ ) =
⋅ Pr x1~VM (0, κ1 ), x2 ~VM (0, κ 2 );
⎜
⎟
N ( N − 1)
⎜ J ~ Gamma J ,τ
⎟
⎜ i
⎟
⎜
⎟
⎝
⎠

( )

+

⎛ κ1 cos ( x1 − Δ ) < log I0 (κ1 ); x1 ~ VM (0, κ1 ); ⎞
⎟
⋅ Pr ⎜
⎜ Ji ~ Gamma J ,τ
⎟
N ( N − 1)
⎝
⎠

K (N − K )

( )

⎛ κ 2 cos x2 > log I0 (κ 2 ) ; x2 ~ VM ( 0,κ 2 ); ⎞
⎟
⋅ Pr ⎜
⎜ Ji ~ Gamma J ,τ
⎟
N ( N − 1)
⎝
⎠
(N − K )(N − K − 1) ⋅ 0.5
+
N ( N − 1)
+

K (N − K )

( )

Each of these proportions correct was determined through Monte Carlo
simulation, i.e. through a large number (10,000) of random draws of x1 and x2
(and of J1 and J2 as well in the case of the VP and VPF models). For each draw,
we evaluated the decision rule, and then computed across all draws the
proportion of correct responses.
Finally, for each model, we discretized parameter space finely and
calculated a look-up table in which each entry gave the predicted probability of a
correct response at one (N,Δ) combination for one parameter combination. Once
we derived proportion correct for each model, the next step was to fit the models
to the subjects’ data. The specific methods for this step are described in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER 3: CHANGE DETECTION TESTING IN RHESUS MONKEYS AND
HUMANS: ENCODING
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Introduction
As described in Chapter 2, we tested the five leading models of VWM
encoding n parallel with monkeys and humans: 1) item-limit 2) equal-precision 3)
equal-precision+fixed capacity 4) variable-precision and 5) variableprecision+fixed capacity (Figure 3.1).
Figure 1

N=2

N=5

Item-Limit

Equal-Precision

Equal-Precision + Fixed Capacity

Variable-Precision

Variable-Precision + Fixed Capacity

Figure 3.1 Schematic representation of resource allocation in five leading models
of VWM. Each box represents an item to-be-remembered and the height of the
fill represents the amount of resource allocated to that item. Set size is 2 (left) or
5 (right), with a hypothetical capacity limit of 3 for the Item-Limit, Equal-Precision
+ Fixed Capacity, and Variable-Precision + Fixed Capacity models.
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According to the item-limit (IL) model, a fixed number of items (the
capacity) are kept in memory with infinite precision, while remaining items are
absent from memory (Cowan, 2001; S J Luck & Vogel, 1997; Pashler, 1988). The
equal-precision (EP) model postulates that all items are remembered with equal
memory precision, but the precision per item decreases with increasing set size
(Palmer, 1990; Shaw, 1980). Decreasing precision is associated with increasing
noise; that is, at a larger set size, each item is remembered in a noisier fashion
(with lower precision). The equal-precision + fixed capacity (EPF) model
combines elements of the item-limit and equal-precision models such that only a
fixed number of items can be remembered, but each item in memory has finite
precision (Zhang & Luck, 2008). When set size is smaller than the capacity, the
model allows for precision to depend on set size. The variable-precision (VP)
model is like the equal-precision model in that all items are remembered with
finite precision but, by contrast, precision can vary from item to item and trial to
trial (Fougnie, Suchow, & Alvarez, 2012; Keshvari et al., 2013; van den Berg,
Shin, et al., 2012). The variable-precision + fixed capacity (VPF) model combines
elements of the item-limit and variable-precision models such that only a fixed
number of items can be remembered, but precision varies across items (van den
Berg et al., 2014). All four finite-precision models (EP, VP, and to a lesser extent,
EPF and VPF) attribute change-detection errors to the difficulty of separating the
signal from noise. For these four models, we used Bayesian inference to model
the decision stage; on each trial, the observer reports the location that has the
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highest probability of containing the changed item (see Chapter 2. The IL, EP,
EPF, VP, and VPF models have 2, 2, 3, 3 and 4 free parameters, respectively.
Three rhesus monkeys were tested for 11,520 trials each and ten humans
were tested for 1152 trials each on the same visual change detection task
(Figure 3.2). Subjects viewed a brief sample array of 2, 3, 4, or 5 randomly
oriented bars (henceforth called items) and, following a delay, a test array
containing two randomly chosen items from the sample array, of which one had a
different orientation than in the sample array. The magnitude of the associated
orientation change could take one of nine values. Subjects identified which item
had changed orientation by touching it, and received trial-to-trial feedback.
Figure 2

Test
Delay
Sample
Fixation
touch to
respond
1000 ms

300 ms
touch to
initiate

Figure 3.2 Trial Procedure. Subjects (monkeys and humans) were asked to
report which item changed in its orientation between sample and test displays.
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Methods
Monkeys
Subjects
Three adult male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta; weights: M1 = 16.5
kg, M2 = 14.5 kg, M3 = 13.51 kg; ages: M1 = 17.5, M2 = 16.5, and M3 = 12.5
years) were tested in a change detection experiment for five days each week.
Food and water were regulated prior to experimental sessions. After completing
daily testing, animals were returned to their caging room, where they were
housed individually and received primate chow and water to maintain their
normal body weight. On days that the monkeys were not tested, they were given
supplemental fruits and vegetables for enrichment in addition to the daily diet. All
animal procedures were performed in accordance with the National Institutes of
Health guidelines, approved by the Institutional Review Board at University of
Texas Health Science Center at Houston, and supervised by the Institutional
Animal Care and Use Committee.
Apparatus
During experimental sessions, the monkeys were placed unrestrained in a
custom-made aluminum experimental chamber (47.5 cm wide x 53.1 cm deep x
66.3 cm high). An infrared touchscreen detected touch responses to a 17"
computer monitor. The touch responses were guided using a Plexiglas template
with 6 cutouts (diameter of each circle cutout = 2.75 cm) that were arranged on
an imaginary circle of 9.0 cm diameter, matching the six possible locations of the
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stimuli, and a cutout in the center (diameter = 2.5 cm) for touches to a fixation
point. Using a computer-controlled relay interface (Model P10-12; Metrabyte,
Taunton, MA), correct responses were rewarded with either a banana pellet or
cherry Koolaid. The relay interface controlled the illumination of the chamber
using a 25 W green light bulb located outside of the chamber. The offset of the
green light illuminating the chamber through a small gap between the
touchscreen and the monitor marked the start of the next trial. Throughout
testing, the monkeys were monitored with a video camera outside the chamber
and focused through a small glass covered port on the right side of the chamber.
Experimental sessions were designed, operated, and recorded using a custom
program written in Microsoft Visual Basic 6.0.
Stimuli
Stimuli consisted of 1.8 cm x 0.4 cm white bars displayed on a black
background. Based on the average distance of the monkey from the screen
(approximately 35 cm), the stimuli subtended a visual angle of 2.9° x 0.65°.
Stimuli were presented in six possible locations on the screen, arranged on an
imaginary circle (see Apparatus).
Trial procedure
Each trial began with a red fixation point in the center of the screen as
shown in Figure 2.1. The monkeys had to make a one-touch response to the
fixation point, which initiated the presentation of a sample display. This display
contained two or more items (see below), and had a duration that differed
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between monkeys and between training and testing (see below). After a delay of
1000 ms, the test display was presented, which always consisted of two items,
placed at the same locations as two items from the sample display. One test item
had the same orientation as the corresponding item in the sample display, and
the other test item had a different orientation. The monkeys’ task was to identify
which item had changed, and to touch that item. The test display remained on
the screen until response. Correct responses were rewarded. An intertrial interval
of 3000 ms followed the choice response, during which a green light illuminated
the chamber and the screen was dark.
Training
Two of the monkeys that participated in this study (M2 and M3) had been
previously trained in a change detection task using clip art images and colored
squares (Elmore et al., 2011). For these two monkeys, we intermixed trials of
oriented bars (new stimuli) with trials of colored squares for initial task
acquisition. Once the monkeys’ performance on these orientation trials was
similar to their baseline color trial performance, we began training them with only
orientation trials. Since M1 had not been previously trained on this task, we
directly trained him with oriented bars. All three monkeys were first trained at set
sizes 2 and 3, change magnitudes of 22.5°, 45°, 67.5°, and 90°, and a sample
viewing time of 1000 ms. Once overall accuracy reached approximately 70%, set
sizes 4 and 5 and finer change magnitudes (10° to 90° in 10° increments) were
gradually introduced. Finally, we gradually reduced sample viewing times while
maintaining approximately 70% accuracy on set size 2 trials. For M1 and M3, this
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led to a viewing time of 300 ms, and for M2 to a viewing time of 600 ms. Total
training lasted approximately 8 months.
Testing
The sample display was shown for 300 ms for M1 and M3, and 600 ms for
M2. Set size was 2, 3, 4, or 5. Set sizes were pseudorandomized within each
192-trial block (48 trials per set size). The orientation of each sample item, θ, was
drawn independently from a uniform distribution over 18 possible orientations (−
90°, −80°,…, −10°, 10°, 20°,…, 80°). The orientation of the changed item in the
test display was drawn from the same distribution, except for orientation of the
other sample items on this trial, so that the changed orientation would not be
confused with other stimuli that did not change. Testing consisted of 60 sessions,
with 192-trial blocks per session, for a total of 11,520 trials per monkey.
Humans
Subjects
Ten human subjects (8 females) aged 21-33 years (mean age = 27.1
years) participated. Each subject visited the lab for two 1.5-hour sessions and
was compensated $10 per session. Study procedures were approved by the
University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston Institutional Review
Board.
Apparatus and stimuli
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Subjects were seated in a chair in a small room equipped with a computer.
At the beginning of the experiment, the distance between the chair and the
screen was adjusted so that the stimuli and display would subtend approximately
the same visual angles as for the monkeys. Subjects were asked to maintain
approximately the same distance. The monitor and touchscreen were identical to
those used for monkeys. Two 25 W light bulbs were mounted on the wall behind
the subjects to provide feedback. Stimuli were identical to those used for
monkeys.
Trial Procedure
The trial procedure was identical to that for the monkeys, except for the
feedback. Feedback consisted of a green room light (75 W) that illuminated the
testing room for 1 s and was accompanied by a tone following correct responses,
or a red light that illuminated testing room for 1 s following incorrect responses.
Training and Testing
Each subject completed two testing sessions, each consisting of three
192-trial blocks, for a total of 1152 trials per subject. Subjects were given a 10minute break time in between blocks. Each subject completed 8 practice trials at
the beginning of the first session.
Model fitting
Denoting all parameters of a model by a vector t, the log likelihood of t (the
parameter log likelihood) is
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ntrials

LL ( t ) = log p ( data | model, t ) = log ∏ p (correctnessi | Ni , Δi , t )
i =1

where the product is over trials (from 1 to ntrials) and correctnessi is 1 if the
subject was correct on the ith trial and 0 if not. We can rewrite this as

LL ( t ) =

ntrials

∑ log p (correctness
i =1

i

| Ni , Δ i , t )

⎡n ( N, Δ,correct ) ⋅ log p ( correct | N, Δ, t ) +
⎤
= ∑∑ ⎢
⎥
N Δ ⎢ + n ( N, Δ,incorrect ) ⋅ log (1 − p ( correct | N, Δ, t ) ) ⎥
⎣
⎦

, (1)

where trials are grouped by set size N, change magnitude Δ, and by whether the
observer was correct or incorrect, and n (N,Δ,correct) is the number of trials with
a particular N, Δ, and correctness.
For each subject data set, we used Eq. (1) and the precomputed look-up table of
model predictions mentioned above to find the log likelihood of each parameter
combination. The parameter combination on this grid that maximized the log
likelihood gives the estimates of the parameters. The model predictions
corresponding to that parameter combination were then used to compute the
model fits to the psychometric curves.
Model comparison
To compare models, we used four metrics: the Akaike Information Criterion
(Akaike, 1974), the Akaike Information Corrected Criterion (Burnham, 2002;
Hurvich & Tsai, 1989), the Bayesian Information Criterion (Schwarz, 1978), and
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the log marginal likelihood (MacKay, 2003). All four measures penalize models
for having more free parameters, but the penalties differ.
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
AIC rewards a model’s good fit but penalizes free parameters. It is defined as

AIC = −2LLmax + 2k ,
where LLmax is the maximum of the parameter log likelihood LL(t) and k is the
number of free parameters in the model. In this thesis, the following multiple of
AIC are reported:

1
AIC* ≡ − AIC = LLmax − k ,
2
so that the leading term is the maximum log likelihood.
Akaike Information Corrected Criterion (AICc)
AICc is a corrected version of AIC, designed for data sets with few trials:

AICc = AIC +

2k (k + 1)
,
ntrials − k − 1

where ntrials denotes the number of trials. We report a modified AICc value,
defined as

1
k (k + 1)
.
AICc * ≡ − AICc = LLmax − k −
2
ntrials − k − 1
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)
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BIC is similar to AIC in that it is also based on the maximum likelihood, but it has
a larger penalty term for the number of free parameters.

BIC = −2LLmax + k log ntrials .
We report the modified BIC,

1
k
BIC* ≡ − BIC = LLmax − log ntrials .
2
2
Log Marginal Likelihood (LML)
Bayesian model comparison consists of calculating the log likelihood of a model
m given the data, LL(model) = log p(data|model). Unlike the previous metrics,
this is not solely based on the maximum likelihood. Instead, it involves integrating
over the parameters; this is also called marginalizing over the parameters, which
is why LL(model) is also called the log marginal likelihood:

LL (model ) = log p ( data | model )
= log ∫ p ( data | model, t ) p ( t | model ) dt
= log ∫ e

LL ( t )

p ( t | model ) dt

For the parameter prior p(t|model), we chose a discrete uniform distribution on
the same grid as used for parameter estimation. We denote the size of the range
of the jth parameter by Rj, and its grid spacing by δtj. Numerical values are
specified in Table S1. We also rewrite slightly so as to avoid highly negative
numbers in the exponent (those cause numerical underflow). Then we find
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k

LL (model ) = LLmax + ∑ log
j =1

δtj
Rj

+ log

∑

e

LL ( t ) −LLmax

.

t on grid

The difference of the log marginal likelihood between two models is also called
the log Bayes factor of those two models.
Bootstrapping
Since we had only three monkey subjects, we used bootstrapping (Efron, 1993)
for each monkey separately to estimate the standard errors on all summary
statistics. The original data set for each monkey consisted of 11,520 trials. We
sampled the same number of trials (a combination of set size, change
magnitude, and correctness) with replacement from this dataset, to create a new
dataset. We repeated sampling 100 times to create 100 bootstrapped data sets
for each monkey. From each individual bootstrapped data set, we estimated the
parameters, computed psychometric curves, calculated R2, and computed AIC,
AICc, BIC, and LML, and computed means for each by averaging across all
bootstrapped data sets from the same monkey, with standard deviations serving
as estimates of the standard errors of the means.

Results and Discussion
For both species, proportion correct decreased monotonically as a
function of set size, with humans being substantially more accurate than
monkeys (Figure 3.3).
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Figure 3
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Figure 3.3 Proportion correct as a function of set size for humans and three
monkeys (M1, M2, and M3).
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A more detailed representation of the data is provided by proportion
correct as a function of change magnitude for each of the four set sizes (Figure
3.4). We found large effects of both set size and change magnitude on VWM
performance in both species (humans: two-way repeated-measures ANOVA; set
size: F(3,27) = 64.05, p < 0.001, change magnitude: F(8,72) = 80.36, p < 0.001).
The dependence on set size replicates findings found in many prior studies, both
with humans (Keshvari et al., 2013; S J Luck & Vogel, 1997; van den Berg, Shin,
et al., 2012; Wilken & Ma, 2004) and with monkeys (Buschman et al., 2011;
Elmore et al., 2011; Heyselaar et al., 2011; Lara & Wallis, 2012). While most
studies have ignored the variable of change magnitude, a few recent studies
have systematically measured the effect of change magnitude and found effects
similar to those shown in Figure 2.4 (Keshvari et al., 2012, 2013; Lara & Wallis,
2012; van den Berg, Shin, et al., 2012). Here, we exploit the statistical strength
afforded by the joint dependencies of proportion correct on set size and change
magnitude to compare models of VWM.
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Figure 3.4 (A) Proportion correct across set size (N) and change magnitude (º)
for humans; mean ± s.e.m. across ten subjects (B – D) Same for M1, M2, and
M3 respectively; mean ± s.e.m. across bootstrapped datasets.
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In spite of the large performance differences between both species, it is
possible that the underlying VWM mechanisms are the same. To test this
possibility, we compared the five leading models of VWM limitations for each
individual monkey and human. We used maximum-likelihood estimation to fit the
parameters in each model for each individual human subject as well as for each
data set sampled using bootstrapping from an individual monkey’s data. We
found that models could not be strongly distinguished based on set size only
(Figures 3.5-3.8).
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Figure 3.5. Proportion correct as a function of set size for humans. Circles and
error bars: behavior; shaded areas: model fits. IL: Item-Limit, EP: EqualPrecision, EPF: Equal-Precision + Fixed Capacity, VP: Variable-Precision, VPF:
Variable-Precision + Fixed Capacity.
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Figure 3.6. Proportion correct as a function of set size for M1. Circles and error
bars: behavior; shaded areas: model fits. IL: Item-Limit, EP: Equal-Precision,
EPF: Equal-Precision + Fixed Capacity, VP: Variable-Precision, VPF: VariablePrecision + Fixed Capacity.
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Figure 7
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Figure3.7. Proportion correct as a function of set size for M2. Circles and error
bars: behavior; shaded areas: model fits. IL: Item-Limit, EP: Equal-Precision,
EPF: Equal-Precision + Fixed Capacity, VP: Variable-Precision, VPF: VariablePrecision + Fixed Capacity.
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Figure 8
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Figure 3.8. Proportion correct as a function of set size for M3. Circles and error
bars: behavior; shaded areas: model fits. IL: Item-Limit, EP: Equal-Precision,
EPF: Equal-Precision + Fixed Capacity, VP: Variable-Precision, VPF: VariablePrecision + Fixed Capacity.
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The added manipulation of change magnitude, however, clearly separates
these model predictions (Figures 3.9-3.12). The data from both species are best
described by the two variable precision models, one in which there is a fixed
capacity limit and another without a fixed capacity limit (VPF: R2 values, M1:
0.902 ± 0.022; M2: 0.887 ± 0.024; M3: 0.896 ± 0.020; Humans: 0.803 ± 0.023;
VP: M1: 0.90 ± 0.023; M2: 0.885 ± 0.024; M3: 0.891 ± 0.020; Humans: 0.799 ±
0.023), followed by the equal-precision + fixed-capacity model (R2 values, M1:
0.755 ± 0.046; M2: 0.854 ± 0.030; M3: 0.817 ± 0.035; Humans: 0.714 ± 0.043),
the equal-precision model (R2 values, M1: 0.718 ± 0.055; M2: 0.835 ± 0.031; M3:
0.817 ± 0.035; Humans: 0.619 ± 0.037), and the item-limit model (R2 values, M1:
0.402 ± 0.041; M2: 0.222 ± 0.038; M3: 0.263 ± 0.049; Humans: 0.228 ± 0.048).
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Figure 9
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Figure 3.9. Proportion correct as a function of set size (N) and change magnitude
(º) for humans. Circles and error bars: behavior; shaded areas: model fits (mean
± s.e.m. across subjects). IL: Item-Limit, EP: Equal-Precision, EPF: EqualPrecision + Fixed Capacity, VP: Variable-Precision, VPF: Variable-Precision +
Fixed Capacity.
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Figure 10
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Figure 3.10. Proportion correct as a function of set size (N) and change
magnitude (º) for M1. Circles and error bars: behavior; shaded areas: model fits
(mean ± s.e.m. across bootstrapped datasets). IL: Item-Limit, EP: EqualPrecision, EPF: Equal-Precision + Fixed Capacity, VP: Variable-Precision, VPF:
Variable-Precision + Fixed Capacity.
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Figure 3.11. Proportion correct as a function of set size (N) and change
magnitude (º) for M2. Circles and error bars: behavior; shaded areas: model fits
(mean ± s.e.m. across bootstrapped datasets). IL: Item-Limit, EP: EqualPrecision, EPF: Equal-Precision + Fixed Capacity, VP: Variable-Precision, VPF:
Variable-Precision + Fixed Capacity.
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Figure 3.12. Proportion correct as a function of set size (N) and change
magnitude (º) for M3. Circles and error bars: behavior; shaded areas: model fits
(mean ± s.e.m. across bootstrapped datasets). IL: Item-Limit, EP: EqualPrecision, EPF: Equal-Precision + Fixed Capacity, VP: Variable-Precision, VPF:
Variable-Precision + Fixed Capacity.
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Possibly a more principled way to compare models is the Bayesian model
comparison, a likelihood-based method that automatically corrects for the
number of free parameters. It is important to note that the variable precision
model with the fixed capacity limit is not a substantial improvement over the
variable precision model without an upper bound, when taking into account that
the former has an extra parameter (in humans, the latter actually performs
marginally better). We thus prefer the simpler version of the variable precision
model. We found that the log marginal likelihood of the variable-precision model
exceeded that of the equal-precision + fixed capacity, equal-precision, and itemlimit models for both species (Figures 3.13 - 3.16); this result remains unchanged
when other model comparison metrics are used (see Table 2.1). These findings
demonstrate that both monkey and human VWM are not limited by a fixed item
capacity, but instead gradually deteriorate as more items have to be
remembered. Despite the quantitative differences in memory performance
between species, the success of the variable-precision model for both species
demonstrates qualitative similarity and suggests evolutionary continuity of basic
VWM mechanisms.
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Figure 13
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Figure 3.13. Marginal log likelihoods of the item limit, equal-precision, equalprecision with fixed capacity, and variable-precision with fixed capacity models
minus those of the variable-precision model (mean ± s.e.m.), for humans. A
value of –x means that the data are ex times more probable under the variableprecision model.
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Figure 14
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Figure 3.14. Marginal log likelihoods of the item limit, equal-precision, equalprecision with fixed capacity, and variable-precision with fixed capacity models
minus those of the variable-precision model (mean ± s.e.m.), for M1. A value of –
x means that the data are ex times more probable under the variable-precision
model.
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Figure 15
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Figure 3.15. Marginal log likelihoods of the item limit, equal-precision, equalprecision with fixed capacity, and variable-precision with fixed capacity models
minus those of the variable-precision model (mean ± s.e.m.), for M2. A value of –
x means that the data are ex times more probable under the variable-precision
model.
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Figure 16
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Figure 3.16. Marginal log likelihoods of the item limit, equal-precision, equalprecision with fixed capacity, and variable-precision with fixed capacity models
minus those of the variable-precision model (mean ± s.e.m.), for M3. A value of –
x means that the data are ex times more probable under the variable-precision
model.
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Table 1

AIC*(model)-

Model

*

IL

EP

EPF

VPF

AICc*(model)*

BIC*(model)-

LML(model)-

*

AIC (VP)

AICc (VP)

BIC (VP)

LML(VP)

Mean

Mean

Mean

s.e.m.

Mean

s.e.m

M1

-126

-125

-122

15

-121

15

M2

-184

-183

-180

18

-180

18

M3

-168

-167

-164

18

-163

18

Humans

-48.2

-47.2

-45.7

6.8

-47.1

6.6

M1

-48.5

-47.5

-44.8

9.2

-48.9

9.1

M2

-13.8

-12.8

-10.1

4.6

-12.7

4.8

M3

-31.3

-30.3

-27.6

7.8

-31.3

8.1

Humans

-13.9

-12.9

-11.4

1.5

-14.4

1.7

M1

-40.2

-40.2

-40.2

7.9

-39.0

7.8

M2

-9.3

-9.3

-9.3

4.4

-6.7

4.6

M3

-24.0

-24.0

-24.0

6.7

-22.6

6.9

Humans

-7.6

-7.6

-7.6

1.5

-6.2

1.6

M1

-0.50

-1.3

-4.18

0.83

1.5

1.5

M2

-0.31

-2.2

-4.0

0.91

1.2

0.81

M3

0.44

-0.56

-3.2

1.5

2.0

1.1

Humans

-0.48

-1.46

-3.00

0.32

-0.57

0.31

Table 3.1. Model comparisons of each model (IL: item-limit, EP: equal-precision,
EPF: equal-precision + fixed capacity, and VPF: variable-precision + fixed
capacity) showing mean differences minus that of the variable-precision model.
The standard error of the mean is the same across AIC, AICc, and BIC because
these measures have the same leading term, LLmax , and only differ in their
penalty terms.
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Given that the fundamental nature of VWM limitations is consistent
between these two species, the quantitative performance differences may simply
be due to differences in their parameter values within the same model (Tables
3.2 and 3.3). Mean precision, J1 , was much lower in monkeys than in humans,
which might be related to attentional differences between the two species. The
exponent, α, in the relationship between mean precision and set size was similar
across monkeys and somewhat higher in humans.
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Humans
Table 2

Model Parameter
IL

EP

EPF

VP

VPF

Tested range
Min Step Max Mean

s.e.m.

K
ε

1

1

5

1.50

0.17

0

0.003

3

0.079

0.011

J1

0

0.13

25

17.7

2.3

α

0

0.015

3

2.07

0.12

K

1

1

5

2.20

0.36

J1

0

0.13

25

15.3

2.5

α

0

0.015

3

1.43

0.25

J1

0

1.01

100

65.8

8.7

τ

0.1

1.11

100

29.3

8.5

α

0

0.03

3

1.82

0.13

J1

0

2.02

200

83.0

17.9

τ

0.1

2.13

200

25.3

5.4

α

0

0.061

3

1.97

0.18

K

1

1

5

4.10

0.28

Table 3.2. Parameter ranges and parameter estimates for humans. Means and
standard errors were computed across subjects.
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Monkeys
Table 3

Tested range
Min Step Max

Mean

M1
s.e.m.

Mean

M2
s.e.m.

Mean

M3
s.e.m.

Model

Parameter

IL

K
ε

1

1

5

1

0

1

0

1

0

0

0.003

3

0.248

0.0055

0.269

0.0062

0.249

0.0065

J1

0

0.13

25

3.51

0.78

2.41

0.68

2.71

0.69

α

0

0.015

3

2.35

0.21

1.98

0.27

1.98

0.26

K

1

1

5

1

0

1.16

0.79

1.12

0.62

J1

0

0.13

25

1.23

0.085

1.12

0.16

1.35

0.31

α

0

0.015

3

1.35

0.60

1.57

0.74

1.89

0.83

J1

0

0.30

30

11.0

1.8

3.82

0.87

7.0

1.8

τ

0.1

0.40

30

24.9

4.4

6.2

2.6

15.7

5.9

α

0

0.03

3

1.47

0.14

1.32

0.14

1.31

0.13

J1

0

0.30

30

10.2

2.7

3.7

1.4

7.7

2.7

τ

0.1

0.40

30

23.8

5.1

5.6

2.8

13.9

5.2

α

0

0.03

3

1.55

0.49

1.47

0.48

1.5

0.41

K

1

1

5

3.6

1.8

3.4

1.5

3.2

1.1

EP

EPF

VP

VPF

Table 3.3. Parameter ranges and parameter estimates for monkeys. Means and
standard errors were computed across bootstrapped datasets.
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Our findings provide cross-species evidence that visual information is
encoded in working memory in a noisy manner, with precision per item varying
across items and trials, and on average decreasing with increasing set size. This
is consistent with mounting evidence in humans (Keshvari et al., 2012, 2013; van
den Berg et al., 2014; van den Berg, Shin, et al., 2012). Variability in precision
could result from a variety of factors including, eye movements, interference from
other stimuli, and fluctuations in attention. At the neural level, precision may
correspond to the gain of a neural population pattern encoding the stimulus (Ma
et al., 2014; van den Berg, Shin, et al., 2012). Neurophysiological evidence
supports this notion, showing that firing rate decreases as set size increases
(Churchland, Kiani, & Shadlen, 2008). A plausible mechanistic implementation of
the variable-precision model was recently proposed (Bays, 2014). Thus, at
present, behavioral, physiological, and computational data seem to
unambiguously point toward resource models as the best account of VWM
limitations, and our results establish rhesus monkeys as a suitable model system
for further elucidating the neural substrates of these limitations.
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CHAPTER 4: CHANGE DETECTION TESTING IN RHESUS MONKEYS AND
HUMANS: DECISION-MAKING
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Introduction
One of the key functions of the brain is to process and interpret sensory
information to make perceptual decisions. Sensory information available to the
subject is necessarily limited. For example, the sensory measurements might be
of low quality, due to both internal (noisy encoding) and external (e.g., poor
contrast, distant or fast-moving objects, etc.) factors. Even when sensory quality
is high, the same sensory stimulus is subject to multiple interpretations. Given
this partially informative sensory information, our inference is probabilistic; that is,
it comes with some degree of uncertainty. The brain must evaluate the uncertain
sensory information effectively, make judgments relative to goals, and respond to
the environment accordingly.
As described in previous chapters, the precision with which sensory
information is represented internally can vary across items and trials, and in
many perceptual tasks, the degree of precision not only has a role in the
encoding stage, but also plays a role in the observer’s decision-making stage.
The change detection task taps into both of these stages of VWM processing.
The observer encodes and maintains information about the sample stimuli,
compares its memory of the sample stimuli with the test stimuli at the
corresponding locations, makes a judgment about which test stimulus has
changed, and then makes a response. In the change-detection task, the
precision of the task-relevant stimulus can be manipulated by changing the
reliability of the stimulus; for example, the height to width ratio of an ellipse in an
orientation change detection task, such that a low reliability ellipse would be
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shorter and wider, making the orientation change more difficult to discriminate.
The question, then, is how the observer factors in unreliable stimuli along with
reliable stimuli in making judgments and decisions about which stimulus changed
in orientation.
A Bayesian-optimal observer would learn to use the noisy internal
representations of the stimuli and essentially compute a probability distribution
indicating where the change occurred, giving more weight to reliable evidence
(e.g., longer and thinner ellipses) than to unreliable evidence (e.g., shorter, fatter
ellipses). Based on the computed relative weight of evidence, the observer
chooses the location with the higher probability of change. Since the uncertainty
can change on an item-by-item and trial-by-trial basis, this requires trial-to-trial
computations of probability distributions over stimulus features. These types of
computations are referred to as probabilistic computations (see Ma, 2012 for a
review).
In a related visual change-detection paradigm, human subjects were
asked to identify whether or not an orientation change occurred in the test display
containing four ellipses (Keshvari, Van den Berg, and Ma, 2012). Reliability of the
stimuli was manipulated (as previously described) and the results were evaluated
by fitting an optimal-observer model against suboptimal models to assess how
the observers took into account the reliability of the stimuli and the variability in
precision. The decision models that were tested differed according to the
assumption that the observer makes about encoding precision.
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Performance was best described by an optimal model, in which the
observer had complete knowledge about precision for every item on every trial.
In the decision stage, the observer uses this information about encoding
precision and about the reliability stimulus differences on an item-by-item and
trial-by-trial basis to make an optimal decision about change. Two suboptimal
models were also tested in which the observer makes an incorrect assumption
about precision by either 1) assuming that precision is completely determined by
the reliability of the stimulus and ignored other sources of variability or 2)
assuming a single value of precision throughout the experiment, and ignored all
sources of variability including manipulations of reliability of the stimulus.
Although monkeys and humans were shown to have similar VWM
encoding mechanisms (Chapter 3), it is nevertheless an open question whether
monkeys would employ similar or different decision processes in this change
detection task. To this end, two rhesus monkeys and ten humans were tested to
determine similarities or differences in decision processes in nearly identical
change detection tasks.
Subjects briefly viewed a sample array of three randomly oriented ellipses
(fixed set size) and, following a delay, a test array containing two randomly
chosen ellipses from the sample array, of which one had a different orientation
than in the sample array (Figure 4.1). The reliability of the stimulus was
manipulated by changing the height-to-width ratio of the ellipse (see Methods).
Thus, on each trial, each item could either be a high-reliability ellipse (longer,
thinner) or a low-reliability (shorter, wider) ellipse. Furthermore, in a manner
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similar to Aim 1, the magnitude of the orientation change could take one of nine
values and subjects identified which item had changed orientation by touching it,
and received trial-to-trial feedback.
Figure 17

Test
Delay
Sample
Fixation
touch to
respond
1000 ms

300 ms
touch to
initiate

Figure 4.1. Task Procedure. Schematic representation showing a sample trial.
Set size was always 3. Stimulus reliability was controlled by ellipse elongation.
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The decision models tested by Keshvari et al. (2012) were adapted to fit
the somewhat different change-detection task used here where subjects were
presented with only two test stimuli each trial and had to report which changed.
The three decision models considered here differed only in the decision rule. For
the encoding stage, precision was modeled based on the variable-precision
model (Chapter 3) since evidence from the first experiment suggested variable
precision encoding by both species (Figure 4.2). The decision rules are based on
the assumption that the observer makes about encoding precision.
Figure 18

Variable
precision

Stimuli

Assumption about
precision

Noisy internal
representations

Decision

Figure 4.2. Flow diagram of the encoding and decision processes. Models here
are identical in the encoding stage, but differ in the assumption that the observer
makes about precision.
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The theory and derivations of these models are described in the Methods
section. In the names of the models below, the “variable precision” before the
hyphen indicates encoding stage and the latter indicates the decision stage,
which is based on the observer’s assumption about precision.
1) Variable Precision-Variable Precision (Optimal): Encoding precision is variable
and the observer has complete knowledge of an item’s precision on each trial.
The observer, thus, computes precision on a trial-by-trial and item-by-item basis,
taking into account the reliability of the stimulus and giving more weight to more
reliable stimuli.
2) Variable Precision-Equal Precision (Suboptimal): Encoding precision is
variable; however, the observer assumes that precision is completely determined
by the reliability of the stimulus, and ignores any other variability in encoding
precision across items and trials. The observer, thus, assumes only two values of
precision: high (when the stimulus has high reliability) and low (when the stimulus
has low reliability).
3) Variable Precision-Single Precision (Suboptimal): Encoding precision is
variable; however, the observer assumes that precision stays constant
throughout the experiment; thus, ignoring both variations due to reliability of the
stimuli and other variability. The observer, then, applies a single value of
precision across all items and trials.
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Methods
Monkeys
Subjects
Two adult male rhesus monkeys, M1 and M2 from Chapter 3 participated
in this experiment (M3 could not participate because of health issues) five days
each week. All animal procedures were performed in accordance with the
National Institutes of Health guidelines, approved by the Institutional Review
Board at University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston, and supervised
by the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee.
Apparatus
Monkeys were tested with the same apparatus as the one described in
Chapter 3.
Stimuli
Stimuli consisted of white ellipses displayed on a black background. Two
types of ellipses were used: “high-reliability” (long and narrow) and “lowreliability” (short and wide). In this experiment, ellipses were chosen instead of
oriented bars (ones used in Chapter 3) because ellipses contain less corner
information and orientation changes are more difficult to discriminate, particularly
as the ellipses get shorter and wider. The size of the high-reliability stimuli was
1.8 x 0.4 cm and that of the low-reliability stimuli was 0.93 x 0.77 cm. The area of
both types of stimuli remained the same; only the height-to-width ratio was
changed. Based on the average distance of the monkey from the screen
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(approximately 35 cm), the high-reliability and low-reliability stimuli subtended a
visual angle of 2.9° x 0.65 ° and 1.5° x 1.3° respectively. Stimuli were presented
in six possible locations on the screen, arranged on an imaginary circle (same as
Chapter 3).
Trial procedure
Each trial began with a red fixation point in the center of the screen as
shown in Figure 4.1. The monkeys had to make a one-touch response to the
fixation point, which initiated the presentation of a sample display. In this
experiment, the set size remained fixed, so the sample display always contained
three items, and had a presentation time of 300 ms. After a delay of 1000 ms,
the test display was presented, which always consisted of two items, placed at
the same locations as two randomly chosen items from the sample display. One
test item had the same orientation as the corresponding item in the sample
display, and the other test item had a different orientation. It is important to note
that the test items always had the same stimulus type (reliability) as the sample
items. For example, a high-reliability sample item would always be a highreliability if it was chosen as a test item; the only change occurred in the
orientation of the changed item. The monkeys’ task was to identify which item
had changed, and to touch that item. The test display remained on the screen
until response. Correct responses were rewarded. An intertrial interval of 3000
ms followed the choice response, during which a green light illuminated the
chamber and the screen was dark. There were four trial conditions: 1) Both test
items were of high reliability; therefore the changed item was of high reliability 2)
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The changed item was of high reliability and the unchanged item was of low
reliability 3) The changed item was low-reliability and the unchanged item was
high-reliability 4) Both test items were low-reliability, so the changed item was
low-reliability.
Training
Both monkeys that participated in this study (M1 and M2) had been
previously trained in a change detection task using oriented bars. For preliminary
training of these two monkeys, we intermixed trials of oriented bars (old stimuli)
with trials of oriented ellipses for initial task acquisition, which required 6 sessions
per monkey. Once the monkeys’ performance on ellipse trials was similar to
baseline performance with oriented bars, we began training them with only
ellipses trials. Both monkeys were first trained with only high-reliability ellipses at
a set size of 2 and a sample viewing time of 300 ms. Once overall accuracy
reached approximately 70%, the monkeys were tested with a set size of 3.
Finally, we gradually intermixed the low-reliability trials with set size 3 and once
the monkeys’ performance on these trials reached 60%, they were ready for
testing. For M1 and M2, this training required 28 and 32 sessions respectively.
Testing
Set size was fixed at 3. On every trial, each item had an equal probability
of being a high- or low-reliability ellipse. The locations of the ellipses were
chosen randomly from 6 possibilities. The orientation of each sample item, θ,
was drawn independently from a uniform distribution over 18 possible
71

orientations (−90°, −80°,…, −10°, 10°, 20°,…, 80°). The orientation of the
changed item in the test display was drawn from the same uniform distribution.
Testing consisted of 60 sessions, with 192-trial blocks per session, for a total of
11,520 trials per monkey.
Humans
Subjects
Ten human subjects (8 females) aged 21-33 years (mean age = 27.1
years) participated. Each subject visited the lab for two 1.5-hour sessions and
was compensated $10 per session. Study procedures were approved by the
University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston Institutional Review
Board.
Apparatus and Stimuli
The apparatus for this experiment remained the same as the one used to
test subjects in Experiment 1 (Chapter 3). Subjects were seated in a chair in a
small room equipped with a computer. At the beginning of the experiment, the
distance between the chair and the screen was adjusted so that the stimuli and
display would subtend approximately the same visual angles as for the monkeys.
Subjects were asked to maintain approximately the same distance. The monitor
and touchscreen were identical to those used for monkeys.
Trial Procedure
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The trial procedure was identical to that for the monkeys, except for the
feedback. Feedback consisted of a green light that was illuminated for 1 s and
accompanied by a tone for correct responses, or a red light illuminated for 1 s for
incorrect responses (same feedback as the one in Chapter 3 experiment).
Training and Testing
Each subject completed two testing sessions, each consisting of three
192-trial blocks, for a total of 1152 trials per subject. Subjects were given a 10minute break time in between blocks. Each subject completed 8 practice trials at
the beginning of the first session (same from Chapter 3 experiment).

Theory and Modeling
Three models of decision-making were considered in this changedetection task. On a given trial, the observer’s decision process consists of an
encoding stage and a decision stage. Here, the encoding stage in all three
models remained identical and was modeled according to the variable precision
model from Aim 1 (see below).
Encoding stage: Variable Precision
For this task, we model encoding precision as a random variable. The
theory and derivations of this encoding stage remain largely the same as one
described in Chapter 2. First, as in Experiment 1, the orientation space was
mapped to the interval [0,2π) by multiplying all orientations and orientation
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change magnitudes by 2 before analysis for simplification. This method was
expressed in all equations shown below; however, for the figures, the change
magnitudes were mapped back to actual orientation space. Second, it was
assumed that both orientations in the test display, denoted by φ1 and φ2, are
known noiselessly to the observer, because they remain on the screen until the
observer responds. Third, the relationship between encoding precision
(expressed as Fisher information denoted J) and the concentration parameter
(denoted κ ) remains the same as in Chapter 2:

J =κ

I1 (κ )
I0 (κ )

,

(6)

where I1 is the modified Bessel functions of the first kind of order 1.
As previously described for the variable precision model, encoding
precision is a random variable that follows, independently for each item and each
trial, a gamma distribution with mean J and scale parameter τ , denoted p(J | J ;τ )
with mean J and variance J τ .
A key difference in this experiment is that mean J differs between the
stimulus type: encoding precision is drawn from two distributions depending upon
stimulus type: For a high-reliability item, mean precision is Jhigh . For a lowreliability item, mean precision is Jlow . The noisy measurements x1 and x2 are
drawn from a doubly stochastic process, where first, precisions J1 and J2 are
each drawn from a gamma distribution with mean Jhigh or Jlow and scale
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parameterτ; then, the noisy measurements are drawn from the Von Mises
distribution (Eqn 2) with concentration parameters κ1 and κ2, which are
determined by J1 and J2 respectively (Eqn 1).

p ( xi | θ i ) =

1
2π I0 (κ i )

κi cos( xi −θi )

e

.

(2)

where I0 is the modified Bessel functions of the first kind of order 0 and the noisy
memory of the ith item in the sample display, denoted xi.
Generative model and Inference
The generative model and inference in this experiment remains the same
as described in Chapter 2. The resulting decision rule is identical to the one used
to model the decision process in Experiment 1. For derivations of the log
posterior ratio, refer to Chapter 2.
The ideal observer responds that the change occurred at location 1 when
the log posterior ratio is positive:

log

I0 (κ1 )
I0 (κ 2 )

+ κ 2 cos ( x2 − ϕ2 ) − κ1 cos ( x1 − ϕ1 ) > 0

This decision rule is valid for all decision models considered here. They simply
differ in how the concentration parameters, κ1 and κ 2 weigh the reliability of the
stimulus. These differences are described below.
Model Differences in Decision Rules
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In the Variable Precision-Variable Precision (optimal) model, the observer
has complete knowledge of precision on every item and trial so uses the actual
values of κ1 and κ2. The decision rule is then to localize the change at location 1
if

log

I 0 (κ1 )
I 0 (κ 2 )

+ κ 2 cos ( x2 − ϕ 2 ) − κ1 cos ( x1 − ϕ1 ) > 0

In the Variable Precision-Equal Precision (suboptimal) model, the
observer assumes equal precision for every item, on every trial. The assumed
value is J high for a high-reliability item, and J low for a low-reliability item. These
correspond to concentration parameters κhigh and κlow. The decision rule, then, is
the same as above but with κ1 and κ2 each taking on one of only two possible
values, κhigh and κlow, depending on the reliability of that item.
In the Variable Precision-Single Precision (suboptimal) model, the
observer completely disregards the reliability of the stimulus and pretends κ1=κ2,
so they do not use a weighted precision value. Then, the decision rule simplifies
to:

cos ( x2 − ϕ2 ) − cos ( x1 − ϕ1 ) > 0
Lapse rate: For each of these models, we fitted a lapse rate parameter
which accounts for errors due to lapses in attention, blinking or eye movements
during stimulus presentation, or errors in making a response.
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Each of these models have 4 parameters: J high , J low , τ , and lapse.
Model predictions
The probability of correct predicted by each model was computed for each
stimulus condition, given the model parameters. Based on the assumptions in the
generative model, in this task, the stimulus condition is determined by change
magnitude Δ, and four condition types, C, described above: 1) Both highreliability 2) Mix stimuli; high-reliability change 3) Mix stimuli; low-reliability
change and 4) Both low-reliability. Thus, the probability that the decision rules for
each of the models returns the correct location is computed when the memories
x1 and x2 follow their respective distributions given C and Δ.
Each of these proportions correct was determined through Monte Carlo
simulation, i.e. through a large number (10,000) of random draws of x1 and x2
and of J1 and J2. For each draw, the decision rule was evaluated, and then
computed across all draws of the proportion of correct responses.
Finally, for each model, the parameter space was discretized finely (see
Table 1) and a look-up table was calculated in which each entry gave the
predicted probability of a correct response at one trial combination (C, Δ) for one
parameter combination.
Model fitting
For a given model, the model parameters are denoted by a vector t. The
log likelihood of t (the parameter log likelihood) is
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ntrials

LL ( t ) = log p ( data | model, t ) = log ∏ p (correctness i | Ci , Δi , t )
i =1

where the product is over trials (from 1 to ntrials) and correctnessi is 1 if the
subject was correct on the ith trial and 0 if not. We can rewrite this as
ntrials

LL ( t ) = ∑ log p ( correctnessi | Ci , Δi , t )
i =1

⎡ n ( C , Δ, correct ) ⋅ log p ( correct | C , Δ, t ) +
⎤
= ∑∑ ⎢
⎥
C Δ ⎢ + n ( C , Δ,incorrect ) ⋅ log (1 − p ( correct | C , Δ, t ) )⎥
⎣
⎦

, (4)

where trials are grouped by trial condition, C, change magnitude Δ, and by
whether the observer was correct or incorrect, and n (C,Δ,correct) is the number
of trials with a particular C, Δ, and correctness.
The same method of maximum likelihood estimation (as one described in
Chapter 3) was used to compute parameter estimates. Thus, for each subject’s
data set Eq. (4) and the precomputed look-up table of model predictions
mentioned above was used to find the log likelihood of each parameter
combination. The parameter combination on this grid that maximized the log
likelihood gives the estimates of the parameters. The model predictions
corresponding to that parameter combination were then used to compute the
model fits to the psychometric curves.
Model comparison
To compare models, the same four metrics from Chapter 3 were used: the
Akaike Information Criterion (Akaike, 1974), the Akaike Information Corrected
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Criterion (Burnham, 2002; Hurvich & Tsai, 1989), the Bayesian Information
Criterion (Schwarz, 1978), and the log marginal likelihood (MacKay, 2003).
Bootstrapping
The original data set for each of the two monkeys consisted of 11,520
trials. The same bootstrapping method (described in Chapter 2) was used to
create 100 bootstrapped data sets for each monkey. A random sample 11,520
trials (a combination of condition, change magnitude, and correctness) was
selected with replacement from the original dataset to create each bootstrapped
data set. The parameter estimates, psychometric curves, R2 values, and model
comparisons (AIC, AICc, BIC, and LML) were generated for each bootstrapped
data set separately. The means for each of these were computed by averaging
across all bootstrapped data sets from the same monkey, and the standard
deviations served as estimates of the standard errors of the means.

Results and Discussion
Humans and monkeys both showed the highest proportion correct at
condition 1, where both stimuli were high-reliability ellipses and the lowest
proportion correct at condition 4, where both stimuli were low-reliability ellipses
(Figure 4.3). Proportion correct was intermediate in the mix conditions (where
one test item was high- and one was low-reliability) compared with conditions
1and 4. Interestingly, in the mix conditions, when the changed item was of high-
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reliability, accuracy was higher than when the changed item was of low-reliability
reflecting their training to look for and chose the stimulus that changed.
Figure 19

Proportion correct

1

0.8

0.6

Humans
M1
M2

0.4

Figure 4.3. Proportion correct across four trial conditions for humans and two
monkeys.
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A more detailed representation of the data is provided by proportion
correct as a function of change magnitude for each of the four conditions (Figure
4.4). We found large effects of both condition (high vs. low reliability) and change
magnitude on performance for both species (humans: two-way repeatedmeasures ANOVA; condition: F(3,27) = 231.35, p < 0.001, change magnitude:
F(8,72) = 64.91, p < 0.001; interaction: F(24,216) = 15.73, p < 0.001).
Interestingly, the effect of change magnitude dissipates in both species in
conditions 3 and 4, when the changed item is a low-reliability stimulus. This
finding of change-magnitude dissipation in condition 3 suggests that both species
took into account the uncertainty of the low-reliable stimulus and gave more
weight to the high-reliable stimulus. And to the extent that the subjects could
judge that the high-reliability item did not change, they were able to infer that the
changed item then must be the low-reliability item. Thus, the change magnitude
of the low-reliability item was less important since the decision could be based on
a ‘default’ response when the subject was confident that the high-reliability item
did not change. Overall, humans performed better than monkeys at all
conditions; however, both species showed strikingly similar qualitative patterns of
performance in all conditions.
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Figure 20

A.

B.

C.

Proportion correct

1

0.8

M1

0.6
0.4
Humans
0.2

30

60

M1
90

30

M2
60

90

30

60

Change magnitude (º)

Both HR

Mix, HR change

Mix, LR change

Both LR

Figure 4.4. (A) Proportion correct as a function change magnitude across four
trial conditions for humans (mean ± s.e.m. across ten subjects) (B) Same for M1
(mean ± s.e.m. across bootstrapped datasets) (C) Same for M2 (mean ± s.e.m.
across bootstrapped datasets)
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In spite of the large quantitative differences between the performances of
both species, it is possible that the underlying mechanisms of perceptual
decision-making are similar. To test this possibility, three decision models were
compared for each individual monkey and human. The parameter estimates in
each model were derived by using maximum-likelihood estimation and were fitted
for each human subject as well as for each data set sampled using bootstrapping
from an individual monkey’s data.
Performance of both species was best described by the variable precisionequal precision suboptimal model (Humans: R2 = 0.875 ± 0.018, M1: R2 = 0.845
± 0.025, M2: R2 = 0.901 ± 0.021), followed by the variable precision-variable
precision optimal model (Humans: R2 = 0.814 ± 0.025, M1: R2 = 0.782 ± 0.031,
M2: R2 = 0.641 ± 0.033), and the variable precision-single precision suboptimal
model (Humans: R2 = 0.431 ± 0.039, M1: R2 = 0.507 ± 0.047, M2: R2 = 0.391 ±
0.038; Figures 4.5 - 4.7). These conclusions were similar when likelihood-based
model comparison metrics were used (Table 4.1).
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Figure 21

Humans
VP - SP

VP - EP

VP - VP

Proportion correct

1

0.8

0.6

0.4

R2 = 0.431 ± 0.039
0.2

30

60

R2 = 0.814 ± 0.025

R2 = 0.875 ± 0.018
90

30

60

90

30

60

90

Change magnitude (º)
Both HR

Mix, HR change

Mix, LR change

Both LR

Figure 4.5. Proportion correct across trial conditions and change magnitudes (º)
for humans. Circles and error bars: behavior; shaded areas: model fits (mean ±
s.e.m. across subjects). VP-SP: Variable Precision-Single Precision, VP-EP:
Variable Precision-Equal Precision, and VP-VP: Variable Precision-Variable
Precision.
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Figure 22

M1
VP - SP

VP - EP

VP - VP

R2 = 0.507± 0.047

R2 = 0.845 ± 0.025

R2 = 0.782 ± 0.031

Proportion correct
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Figure 4.6. Proportion correct across trial conditions and change magnitudes (º)
for M1. Circles and error bars: behavior; shaded areas: model fits (mean ± s.e.m.
across bootstrapped datasets). VP-SP: Variable Precision-Single Precision, VPEP: Variable Precision-Equal Precision, and VP-VP: Variable Precision-Variable
Precision.
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Figure 23

M2
VP - SP
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VP - VP

Proportion correct
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Figure 4.7. Proportion correct across trial conditions and change magnitudes (º)
for M2. Circles and error bars: behavior; shaded areas: model fits (mean ± s.e.m.
across bootstrapped datasets). VP-SP: Variable Precision-Single Precision, VPEP: Variable Precision-Equal Precision, and VP-VP: Variable Precision-Variable
Precision.
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Table 4

AIC*/AICc*/BIC*(model)AIC*/AICc*/BIC* (VP-EP)

Model

VP-SP

VP-VP

LML(model)LML(VP-EP)

Mean

s.e.m. Mean

s.e.m

M1

-107

14

-107

14

M2

-199

23

-204

24

Humans

-57.5

5.9

-39

4.5

M1

-16

11

-19

11

M2

-102

17

-107

17

Humans

-12.1

2.4

-2.4

1.4

Table 4.1. Model comparisons of two models (VP-VP: variable precision-variable
precision and VP-SP: variable precision-variable precision) showing mean
differences minus that of the winning model, variable precision-equal precision
model. The VP-EP model outperforms the other models according to all metrics.
The means and standard error of the means are the same across AIC, AICc, and
BIC because these measures have the same leading term, LLmax , and an equal
number of parameters.
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These findings demonstrate that monkeys and humans are Bayesianobservers that take into account the uncertainty of sensory observations when
making perceptual judgments, giving more weight to more certain evidence (see
parameter estimates in Table 4.2). Even though encoding precision varies on an
item-by-item and trial-by-trial basis, in this task, humans and monkeys make a
wrong assumption about precision, and assume two values of precision that are
completely determined by the reliability of the stimulus. They ignore other
variability in encoding precision that may arise due to noise from both external
and internal factors to the brain.
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Table 5

Monkeys
Tested Range

Humans

M1

M2

Model

Parameter

Min

Step

Max

Mean ± s.e.m.

Mean ± s.e.m.

Mean ± s.e.m.

VP-VP

J high

0

1.01

100

7.0 ± 1.9

6.8 ± 1.2

30.3 ± 3.6

J low

0

1.01

100

1.08 ± 0.26

1.07 ± 0.24

1.72 ± 0.34

τ

0.1

1.1

100

61 ± 18

63 ± 17

45 ± 11

lapse

0

0.002

0.2

0.041 ± 0.038

0.044 ± 0.034

0.046 ± 0.018

J high

0

1.01

100

6.34 ± 0.92

9.2 ± 1.9

38.4 ± 4.4

J low

0

1.01

100

1.09 ± 0.28

1.46 ± 0.54

2.32 ± 0.45

τ

0.1

1.1

100

22.7 ± 4.7

41 ± 10

42.9 ± 7.8

lapse

0

0.002

0.2

0.210 ± 0.002

0.19 ± 0.026

0.031 ± 0.013

J high

0

1.01

100

9.8 ± 3.7

7.85 ± 0.94

29.0 ± 3.1

J low

0

1.01

100

4.1 ± 1.8

4.0 ± 0.47

5.35 ± 0.77

τ

0.1

1.1

100

52 ± 25

70 ± 12

22.4 ± 5.4

lapse

0

0.002

0.2

0.17 ± 0.061

0.011 ± 0.031

0.088 ± 0.018

VP-EP

VP-SP

Table 4.2. Parameter ranges and parameter estimates. For monkeys, means and
standard errors were computed across 100 bootstrapped data sets. For humans,
means and standard errors were computed across subjects.
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These findings differ from those in a related change-detection task
(Keshvari et al., 2012). Notably, the change-detection task used in the two
studies differed in some important ways that changes the complexity of the task.
First, the sample display in this study contained three items as opposed to four
items in the Keshvari et al. (2012) study. Second, in the Keshvari study, subjects
were asked to report whether or not a change occurred in two consecutive
displays that were identical, except for one changed item in 50% of the trials. In
the current study, there was always a change in the orientation of one of the
items between displays and the task was to identify where the change occurred.
Subjects in this study had a 50% chance of responding correctly, since only two
items were shown during test. Third, in the Keshvari study, both the sample and
test stimuli were presented for 100 ms each, whereas in this study, sample
viewing time was 300 ms and the test stimuli remained on the screen until
response. The latter two differences change the dependence of the task
parameters and thus the generative model, which changes the inference and
decision rules in many ways. Lastly, in the Keshvari (2012) task, subjects did not
receive trial-to-trial feedback, whereas in this study, both humans (green light +
tone) and monkeys (food reward) received trial-to-trial feedback. It has been
suggested that when subjects receive trial-to-trial feedback to their responses,
both humans and nonhuman animals could learn the values of the task variables,
and use them strategically rather than relying on the internal estimates of
uncertainty in the sensory measurements of those variables (Ma, 2012). For
example, in our task, after receiving feedback, subjects (both humans and
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monkeys) may have learned that they could maximize their performance by
strategically allocating attention only to the high-reliability stimuli. It remains to be
understood which of these differences could have contributed to the differences
in the findings.
Change detection has primarily been used to understand the encoding
limitations of VWM processing. This is the first account of testing monkeys in a
change-detection task to understand whether monkeys use Bayesian-inference
in perceptual decision-making. Our findings provide cross-species evidence that
while humans and monkeys may be Bayesian observers, they may not always
use probabilistic computations for optimal decision-making. In this regard,
primates in general might be suboptimal, depending on the complexity of the
task. It remains to be understood at which point optimality breaks down, even
though probabilistic computations continue to be performed at the neural level.
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CHAPTER 5: GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
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General Conclusions
The experiments presented in this thesis combined tools of
psychophysics, learning, memory and computational modeling to compare for the
first time encoding and decision processes of rhesus monkeys to those of
humans in nearly identical visual working memory (VWM) tasks. In Aim 1
(Chapter 2), predictions of five leading models of VWM encoding limitations were
tested in monkeys and humans using a change-detection task, where set size
and change magnitude were systematically manipulated. In Aim 2 (Chapter 3),
the change-detection task from Chapter 2 was modified to investigate whether
monkeys and humans integrate uncertain sensory information from multiple
items and whether they do so in an optimal fashion. Although change detection
has been studied extensively in humans, several of these models had not been
applied to the specific parameters of this task, and no previous study had
compared all of these models in parallel with monkeys and humans.
I have shown here that in both species, resource models in general,
provided a much better fit to the data than the classic item-limit (“slot”) model.
Resource models account for noisy encoding of stimuli, as opposed to an “all-ornone” storage. In accord with this theory, the errors in performance are then due
to a problem in separating the signal from noise, rather than due to a fixed limit in
the number of items that can be remembered. This notion fits well within the
framework of signal detection theory and has been shown in many Bayesian
models of perception, including change detection and its close variants (Elmore
et al., 2011; Keshvari et al., 2012, 2013; Lara & Wallis, 2012; van den Berg, Shin,
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et al., 2012; Wilken & Ma, 2004). A question that we do not formally address here
is the source(s) of noise. Errors in recollecting stimuli from memory could be due
to several factors that arise at different stages of memory processing; for
example, noise during initial encoding of stimulus when sensory information is
processed (particularly due to short viewing times), inability to maintain these
memory representations when they are no longer accessible for view (delay
period), difficulty retrieving memory of a sample stimulus, or deciding which
response to make. We do not formally distinguish among these possibilities
here; however, future studies might consider investigating these sources of
noise, whether they can be manipulated or minimized, and how the nature of
memory will be affected.
Specific to the class of resource models, results from both species support
the notion of variability in memory precision, which allows for flexible allocation of
precision for the encoding of most (if not all) items in the visual scene, as
opposed to being equally distributed and/or with a fixed cap (Palmer, 1990;
Zhang & Luck, 2008). We found that precision per item varies across stimuli and
trials, and on average decreases with increasing set size. These findings are
consistent with mounting evidence in humans across multiple tasks – change
detection, change localization (color and orientation change), and delayedestimation (color and orientation) -- providing further support for the variable
precision point of view (Fougnie et al., 2012; Keshvari et al., 2012, 2013; van den
Berg et al., 2014; van den Berg, Shin, et al., 2012). While the origins of the
variability in precision are not completely understood, several factors could be at
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play; for example, eye movements, fluctuations in attention over items and trials,
differences in precision due to stimulus effects such as cardinal orientations and
configural grouping, and variability in memory decay rates across stimuli (Brady
& Tenenbaum, 2013; Fougnie et al., 2012; Girshick, Landy, & Simoncelli, 2011;
Lara & Wallis, 2012; Nienborg & Cumming, 2009).
We considered two variants of the variable-precision model in Aim 1. One
version was a variable-precision model with no fixed item limit, and the other was
a hybrid model with an item limit. It is important to address the key parameters of
these winning models. The parameter J1 that characterizes mean precision when
set size is 1, differed greatly within individual subjects and between species.
Differences in the values of mean precision could be attributed to several factors,
including the stimulus-related effects, level of motivation, fatigue, or distraction. A
second parameter, α , captures the effect of set size on mean precision, and
describes the power with which precision per item decreases as set size
increases. If set size had no effect on memory precision, then the value of α
would be 0 (indeed, when set size was fixed in Aim 2 and thus had no effect on
precision, we eliminated this parameter). We found that in both species and in
both variants of the variable precision model, the α values were more negative
than -1, indicating steep decreases in mean precision as set size increases.
In the variable-precision model with the fixed item limit, we found that K
(typically taken to be the item limit number) was equal to about 3.5 in monkeys
and 4.1 in humans. In initial reading, these values of K might be reminiscent of
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the famous magical number 4 ± 1 items. However, it is important to realize that
there is nothing magical about the values of this parameter. These values seem
to vary largely across memory tasks, set sizes, as well as stimulus complexity,
and are greatly dependent on which model is being considered; in fact, across
monkeys and humans these values have been shown to vary anywhere from
less than 1 to more than 6 items (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Buschman et al.,
2011; Elmore et al., 2011; Eng et al., 2005; Heyselaar et al., 2011; Keshvari et
al., 2013; Lara & Wallis, 2012; van den Berg et al., 2014; van den Berg, Shin, et
al., 2012; Zhang & Luck, 2008). It is being suggested that if one were to adhere
to the idea of a magical number for capacity, then the power value of α is a
better replacement for K, as it provides a better characterization of the interplay
between precision and set size to describe VWM limitations (Ma, 2014; under
review). We do not interpret the value of K as the maximum limit on how many
items can be remembered. Instead, we believe that it represents the number of
items that an observer might process on a given trial (which could be a subset of
total items presented), depending on their level of motivation, attention, or any
strategic employments. Of course, memory resource (and precision) is limited,
and as the amount of information presented increases, this resource may not in
practice be infinitely divisible. In such cases, it is possible that observers flexibly
allocate memory resource to a subset of visual stimuli (which could be an item or
a combination of stimulus features as when viewing natural scenes).
In Aim 2, we found that monkeys and humans are Bayesian-observers
and take into account the uncertainty of sensory observations when making
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perceptual judgments, giving more weight to more certain evidence. However,
while memory precision varies on an item-by-item and trial-by-trial basis, in this
task, humans and monkeys seemed to make an incorrect assumption about
precision, and assume two values of precision that are completely determined by
the reliability of the stimulus. They ignore any additional variability in precision
that may arise due to noise from both external and internal factors to the brain.
This begs the question, how can observers make a wrong (or right) assumption
about precision? In probabilistic models, it is suggested that neural populations
encode with probability distributions over stimulus values on a trial-by-trial and
item-by-item basis (rather than using point estimates). This “implicit” knowledge
of the internal representations of stimuli can then be used in downstream
computation for perceptual judgment and decision-making in optimal or
suboptimal ways. Since these computations have been shown to differ based on
the complexity of the tasks in both humans and monkeys, it is important to
investigate which factors determine whether optimal or suboptimal decision rules
are used (Gu, Angelaki, & DeAngelis, 2008; Keshvari et al., 2012; Ma & Jazayeri,
2014; van den Berg, Vogel, Josic, & Ma, 2012; Yang & Shadlen, 2007).
We think that the most remarkable findings in these series of experiments
are the qualitative similarities that these two primate species share in both
encoding and decision-making. In both aims, we found that despite the
quantitative performance differences between the two species, the same winning
models account for the species’ behavior. The qualitative similarities between the
two species shown here may have been expected because rhesus monkeys
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have been shown to share many aspects of memory processes with humans.
For example, monkeys show the same primary and recency effects in serial
position functions and show striking similarities with humans providing evidence
for a continuous-resource model (Elmore et al., 2011; Roberts & Kraemer, 1981;
Sands & Wright, 1980; Wright, Santiago, Sands, Kendrick, & Cook, 1985).
Nevertheless, it is one thing to expect similarities from our experiments, but it is
another thing altogether to show them and show just how extensive they are.
These earlier findings along with ours are suggestive of evolutionary
continuity and common underlying mechanisms of VWM processes in primates
generally. Indeed, rhesus monkeys and humans have similar neural architecture,
especially the visual cortex and areas of the prefrontal cortex that are relevant to
VWM processing (Funahashi et al., 1989; Orban, Van Essen, & Vanduffel, 2004;
Petrides, 1996). Our results, thus, establish rhesus monkeys as a suitable model
system for further elucidating the neural substrates of VWM limitations in
encoding and decision-making. The combination of psychophysics,
computational modeling, and neurophysiological methods offers great potential to
unravel how VWM works and why it fails.

Future directions
It is encouraged that future studies using change detection not only
consider the typical manipulation of set size, but also vary change magnitude. As
demonstrated here, the addition of the change-magnitude manipulation unveils
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profound differences in model predictions. In the same vein, future studies aimed
at understanding the mechanisms of VWM should provide direct comparisons
across many if not all leading models (than considering just one or two), because
only then can goodness-of-fit be properly compared across models and
arguments of specific processing. Indeed, a recent study that conducted a
factorial comparison of 32 models that reanalyzed data from several studies of
VWM limitations found that the conclusions of these data could greatly differ from
previously-made claims, when such an approach is used (van den Berg et al.,
2014).
The studies described here (and a growing body of research in humans)
have pointed to the variability in precision as the key factor in characterizing
VWM limitations, although the neural basis of variability in precision is only
beginning to be explored (Emrich, Riggall, Larocque, & Postle, 2013; Ester,
Anderson, Serences, & Awh, 2013). In general, the neural substrates of VWM
limitations have previously been based on the framework of fixed-capacity
models. But now with a growing body of evidence in humans for the variableprecision model, coupled with identical findings in monkeys from this study, there
is convergent evidence for the fundamental underlying processes of VWM that
will serve as a standard for guiding and interpreting neurobiological investigations
of the complex maze of neural circuits responsible for memory.
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